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I. INTRODUCTION
What defines a man or a woman? What are the differences between the
two? Stereotypically, a man is seen as handsome, strong, instinctive, and
assertive. In contrast, a woman is often described as beautiful, soft, patient,
and understanding. Notwithstanding these archaic understandings of sex
and gender-based stereotypes, who has the authority to say that a man
cannot be whatever a woman is and that a woman cannot be whatever a
man is?
How we each individually identify as human beings directly affects how
*
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we operate as a civilization, as a society, and as a species.1 This core sense
of “self” governs how we traverse through our daily lives.2 What happens,
however, when the way we construe our inborn identity is in direct conflict
with the way others perceive our identity? To members of the transgender
community, this conflict is inescapable, and the law has provided little
protective recourse for such conflicts as they arise within the workplace—
resulting in a gravely uncertain situation for transgender employees.3
For at least thirty-four years, members of the transgender community
have struggled to assert legal protections that preclude employers from
engaging in discriminatory conduct ultimately resulting in their
termination.4 This discriminatory conduct originates in the same sexnormative stereotypes—stereotypes that mandate how the male and female
sexes are “supposed” to behave and how the bodies of a man and woman
are “supposed” to appear—that have fueled the unequal treatment of not
just transgender people, but also female, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.5
As a result, the use of workplace restrooms, one of the last spaces
segregated on the basis of a sexual binary,6 has created glaring
1. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007);
Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam);
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. Compare Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218 (concluding that neither Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act nor an Equal Protection argument brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
afforded a transgender individual any remedy at law against her former employer for
terminating her on the basis of her transgender identity), and Holloway, 566 F.2d at
661 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to a transgender
claimant’s former employer and holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act neither
contemplates nor embraces transgender/transsexual discrimination), with Glenn v.
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district court’s judgment
in favor of a transgender individual wrongfully terminated from her workplace on the
basis of gender stereotyping, and concluding that sex-based discrimination premised on
“gender-noncomformity” is subject to the heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to
Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 37, 38 (2000); see Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality
Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L.
REV. 159, 179 (2002); see also Anthony v. Alfieri, (Un)covering Identity in Civil
Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805, 812-13, 826-27 (2007).
6. Lara E. Pomerantz, Comment, Winning the Housing Lottery: Changing
University Housing Policies for Transgender Students, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1215,
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psychological and physical harms for members of the transgender
community.7 Moreover, because the discrimination faced by members of
the transgender community is indelibly connected to the issues of gender
and sex, workplace bathroom use and sex-specific workplace attire
emphasize how innate identity and the way others perceive the transidentity are in direct conflict.8 Thus, transgender individuals’ workplaces
have developed into battlegrounds on which the fight for transgender
equality has, in large part, been disastrous.9
Federal appellate courts are divided over whether an employer may
terminate a transgendered employee’s occupational post on the basis of his
or her status as a transgender individual irrespective of protections that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may provide.10 This split of
1234 (2009).
7. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence:
What Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 115, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Feldblum, The Right to Define]; Boaz I. Green,
Discussions and Expression of Gender and Sexuality in Schools, 5 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 329, 333 n.30 (2004); Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of
Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments
Paving the Way to the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895,
896 (2006).
8. Elkind, supra note 7, at 921; see also infra Part II and note 15.
9. See e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d
748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D.
Ohio 2003); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. 2001); see also Hispanic AIDS
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
10. Compare Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding
that sex-based discrimination premised on “gender-noncomformity” is subject to the
heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
further observing that, had the transgender plaintiff filed a claim under the Civil Rights
Act, Title VII would have equally provided her a remedy at law), Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing the district court’s
narrow statutory interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because the Act
contemplates instances of sex-discrimination on the basis of the claimant’s “appearance
and mannerism”), and Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (upholding the district court’s finding that a school’s policy of
allowing a transgender employee to use the restroom of the gender with which she
identified neither violated another teacher’s religious freedoms nor any other actionable
discrimination claim), with Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224 (holding that neither Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act nor the Equal Protection Clause afforded a transgender employee
any legal recourse against her former workplace for wrongfully terminating her on the
basis of her status as a transgender person), Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (determining that discrimination against transgender
persons does not fall within the ambit of Title VII), Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750
(affirming the District Court’s finding that the plain meaning of the language in Title
VII must be ascribed to the common meaning of the term “sex,” which, it concluded,
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authority originates from the judiciary’s conflation and disaggregation of
the meaning of sex and gender as well as its failure to recognize that gender
operates as a continuum along which male and female represent the
extremes, and not as a restrictive binary construct of male and female.11
“Gender discrimination” is substantially more complex than conduct
resulting in the disparate treatment of an individual premised on the
prejudices regarding that person’s sex. “Gender discrimination” attacks the
very core of an individual’s innate identity and that individual’s ability to
manifest his or her own destiny. Accordingly, “gender discrimination” is a
violation of an individual’s substantive due process right to liberty.12
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part II wrestles with the
definitions of sex and gender and explains why the failure to explicate the
complexity of these terms is particularly pernicious to the transgender
individual. Part III traces the failure of the Supreme Court’s “gender
discrimination” jurisprudence to provide a workable standard that combats
the legal disparities suffered by those whose identities are classified as “the
others.”13 It provides a detailed examination and evaluation of why the
Court’s simultaneous conflation and disaggregation of sex and gender and
its failure to recognize a gender continuum reaffirms the socially-created
inferiority of women, homosexuals, bisexuals, and transgender people.
Part IV examines the Court’s understanding of innate identity. In
particular, it assesses how the Court has addressed the legal disparities that
provided no protections for trans-identifying individuals), and Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Title VII fails to
embrace transgender/transsexual discrimination), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
11. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11, 25, 40 (1995); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,”
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1995); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52
STAN. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (2000).
12. See Rebecca Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1541
(2002); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2011); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 512 n.1 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion).
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the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities face. Part V examines how
Title VII might be applied to transgender employees seeking legal
protection within the workplace. Finally, Part VI calls for a re-evaluation
of what the Court currently considers “gender discrimination” and proposes
a new standard by which the Court should apply protections.

II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF SEX AND GENDER DEFINED
The concepts of sex and gender are related to the very core of one’s own
sense of identity.14 Each individual maintains a particularized sex and
gender. There are many, however, whose particularized sex and gender
manifest in conflict, requiring us to engage in a thoughtful analysis about
the meaning of both terms.15 A failure to thoughtfully explore these
definitions can produce substantially inconsistent applications of the law
and can even undermine entire legal doctrines.16
Nevertheless, since 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States has
struggled to define the concepts of sex and gender in its attempts to extend
equal protection of the law under a theory of “gender discrimination.”17 To
a large degree, the Court has conflated the concepts of sex and gender by
using the terms interchangeably, signaling inaccurately that every person’s

14. See Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 124.
15. The terms “sex” and “gender” are encumbered with nuances and ambiguities
that are not easily conveyed. Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1221 (citing Judith Butler,
Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity (1990)); see also Elaine Crain,
Trans-phobia and the Relational Production of Gender, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
137, 138-39 (2007); Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The
Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 84
(2008); Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 256-58 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 285
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s perpetuation of discriminatory
conduct it previously deemed invalid); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 511-12 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s misconceived understanding of its previous opinion
within Frontiero); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (concluding that
pregnancy is not sex discrimination within the context of the Equal Protection Clause).
17. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion) (holding that classifications
based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, and
that statutes providing, solely for administrative convenience, that spouses of male
members of the armed services are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased
quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits, but that spouses of female
members are not dependents unless they are in fact dependent for over one-half of their
support, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by requiring a female member to prove dependency of her husband).
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sex is also that person’s gender.18 On other occasions, members of the
Court have rejected this conflation, and, in turn, have derisively attempted
to define the terms in a simplistic, disaggregated fashion.19 Justice Antonin
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.20 provides such
an example:
The word “gender” has acquired the new and useful connotation of
cultural attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)
distinctive of the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to
female and masculine is to male.21

Undoubtedly, to Justice Scalia, “cultural attitudinal characteristics,”22 or
what he defines as “gender,” are neither what the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates nor what the Equal Protection
Clause intended to reach, because “attitudinal characteristics,” by their very
nature, are mutable.23
Neither of these definitions adequately describes the complexity of sex
and gender. Indeed, defining sex solely based on the anatomical presence
of a penis or a vagina or on one’s chromosomal configurations is logically
and scientifically insufficient.24 Researchers hypothesize that between one

18. See, e.g., Feeny, 442 U.S. at 274-75; Craig, 429 U.S. at 192; Schlesinger, 419
U.S. at 509-10; Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974).
19. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
20. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
21. Id. at 156 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Cf. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (citing
United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (viewing
Carolene Products as providing guidance into the immutability component of
heightened judicial scrutiny within the context of equal protection as defined as
“discrete and insular” groups); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1975). The
leading formulation for heightened scrutiny within the Equal Protection analysis
derives from footnote four of Carolene Products, where the Court opined that “discrete
and insular minorities” constitute what are now acknowledged as suspect classes. See
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. In that regard, the Court oftentimes asks
whether an offender’s discriminatory conduct is based on an “immutable characteristic”
of the suspect class. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion).
24. P.L. Chau & Jonathan Herring, Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, 16
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM., 327, 329-32 (2002); Franke, supra note 11, at 5, 40; Phyllis
Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. the Cider House Rules:
Transgenders Struggle with the Courts Over What Clothing They are Allowed to Wear
on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, the Right to Marry,
and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 168 (2000)
(noting other chromosomal variations outside the scope of the generally accepted
binary construction of XY and XX). See generally Jill Rebecca Oliver, A
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and four percent of the world’s population maintains chromosomal
variations that are not in harmony with archaic understandings of how the
judiciary and the Euro-American culture define man and woman—an
understanding that totally disregards the existence of intersexuality.25
Recent medical studies further demonstrate that a person’s sex is comprised
of a total of nine different factors.26 Sex is biological, but it is entirely too
complex a concept to reduce to genetic composition or the primary sex
organs of an individual. Accordingly, sex is best described as the outside
physical or perceived surface identity of a person.27
Gender, however, refers to a person’s innate core identity: a person’s
true sense of self.28 Gender-expression is the manifestation of one’s inner
self and is frequently equated with socially normative, dichotomous EuroAmerican stereotypes of what it means to be a man or a woman. But, a
person’s gender may reject this dichotomy or the socially normative roles
the dichotomy belies. Although gender is connected to one’s psyche, it is
no less biological than sex because it influences one’s sexual
development.29 But sole reliance on the biomedical sciences ultimately
provides no formulaic means to completely distinguish sex from gender
because they are interrelated.30 Gender influences sexual development, and
sex may assist one in understanding one’s gender. Therefore, when the
Court engages in a colloquy on the topic of what it calls “gender
discrimination,” it must neither assume that sex and gender are identical
nor that sex and gender are severable.
As one wrestles with attempts to define the terms, one must be mindful
that each person has a particularized sex and gender. In that regard, a large
majority of the population maintains a gender that manifests itself
correlative to one’s sex. Alternatively, however, there are many whose
gender manifests itself in conflict with their sex. These persons transcend
and resist society’s normative sex stereotypes, and identify as members of
Multidimensional Model of Biological Sex (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Waterloo) (on file with University of Waterloo’s Institutional
Repository),
available
at
http://www.uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/10012/6444/1/Oliver_Jill.pdf.
25. Frye, supra note 24, at 147, 168.
26. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing to
the scientific findings of Dr. Wallace Bockting, a tenured associate professor at the
University of Minnesota Medical School who specializes in what the court labeled
“gender identity disorders”); Valdes, supra note 11, at 20 (citing elements that are
considered in determining one’s sex).
27. Cf. Franke, supra note 11, at 35; Frye, supra note 24, at 161.
28. Franke, supra note 11, at 35; Frye, supra note 24, at 169.
29. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306; see also Franke, supra note 11, at 34-36.
30. See Franke, supra note 11, at 1-3.
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the transgender community.31
Notwithstanding the complexities of these terms, the United States
Supreme Court’s development of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence
demonstrates a failure to understand the complex interrelationship of sex
and gender,32 in turn, foreclosing constitutional protections to the
transgender person. Indeed, the Court’s acknowledgment of what it has
deemed as the relevant differences between the male and female sexes
eviscerates any possibility of truly achieving total gender equality.33 As a
result, the Court’s failure to provide a viable standard to combat what it has
titled “gender discrimination” has provided little legal remedy and no
constitutional protections for the transgender individual in the workplace.34

31. Many appellate courts have relied on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders’ fourth edition (“DSM-IV”). See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d
1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th
Cir. 1984). However, DSM-IV provides a perfunctory appreciation for members of the
transgender community and trivializes the trans-identity by referencing it as “gender
identity disorder.” CHESTER W. SCHMIDT ET AL., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 532–33 (Michael B. First et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994).
Further it completely dismisses an actual understanding of sex and gender
incongruence by suggesting cursory examples of a mere “desire” to disassociate from
normative sex stereotypical behavior as being clearly symptomatic of transgenderism.
Id. at 533-34. This hasty evaluation of what it means to be transgender should be
rejected. One can only hope that the relabeling of “gender identity disorder” to “gender
dysphoria” in DSM-V—released in May 2013—presents a more favorable appreciation
and deeper understanding of transgenderism and transsexuality. Camille Beredjick,
DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender Dysphoria’, ADVOCATE.COM
(July
23,
2012,
8:00
PM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-genderidentity-disorder-gender-dysphoria; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under
the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 4 (Paisley Currah, Richard M.
Juang & Shannon Prince Minter eds., 2006).
32. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Meritor Sav.
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); see also Franke, supra note 11, at 1; Valdes, supra
note 11, at 20-21.
33. See, e.g., Nyugen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 157 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (10th Cir.
2007); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir.
1977); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994);
Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993); K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of
Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977).
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III. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE GENDER EQUALITY FOR THE TRANSGENDER
INDIVIDUAL UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has struggled to provide a
standard capable of providing equal protection of the law and to address
cases premised on issues of “gender discrimination.”35 In the watershed
opinion, Frontiero v. Richardson,36 a plurality of the Court finally
acknowledged the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”
within the United States.37 Writing for the plurality, Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., traced the indoctrinated legal subjugation of the female sex
back one hundred years to Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s concurring opinion
in Bradwell v. State of Illinois.38 Through Justice Brennan’s colloquy, the
Court noted several examples of the legal injustices suffered by the female
sex, including a woman’s inability to hold office, serve on juries, file legal
claims in her own name, hold or convey property in her own name, or serve
as legal guardians for her own children.39 In recognizing that the legal
subjugation of the female sex was based on “gross, stereotyped
distinctions,” which, “in practical effect put women, not on a pedestal, but
in a cage,”40 a plurality of the Court invalidated a law that applied different
standards for male and female service members’ spouses seeking to obtain
increased quarter allowances.41
At first blush, the plurality’s holding in Frontiero v. Richardson appears
to be a phenomenal victory, providing the applicable standard by which
courts will analyze “gender discrimination” claims. The plurality,
however, failed to state with particularity that the government’s
unconstitutionally discriminatory conduct is not occasioned merely by the
presence of certain rudimentary biological indicators.42 Rather, the
plurality actually reasoned its analysis on societal, normative sex-based
stereotypes. To be sure, “gender discriminatory” conduct does not infringe
merely upon the physicality of one’s person; it violates the very core of
one’s conception of identity by categorically placing an individual within
35. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690
(1973) (plurality opinion).
36. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 684-85 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)) (noting that it was contrary to the “law of the Creator” for a woman to
adopt a distinct and independent career from that of her husband because the
“paramount destiny and mission of woman” is that of mother and wife).
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id. at 684-85.
41. Id. at 678-79.
42. See generally Frontiero, 411 U.S. 577 (plurality opinion).
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the traditionally constructed normative social roles of the male and female
sexes.43 But the plurality’s cursory assessment of the origins of “gender
discrimination” and its failure to clearly articulate the subtle distinctions
between sex and gender inadvertently gave rise to the conflation of the two
terms.
The Court subsequently affirmed this mistaken conflation of sex and
gender in its review of Kahn v. Shevin,44 Schlesinger v. Ballard,45
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeny,46 and Craig v. Boren.47
Throughout the entirety of these opinions, the terms sex and gender are
carelessly used interchangeably,48 setting forth imprecisely reasoned
discussions that occasionally resulted in what a majority (or plurality) of
the Court considered an equitable result.
In contrast to the law that was previously struck-down in Frontiero, a
majority of the Court in Kahn v. Shevin affirmed a Florida statute that
provided greater tax exemptions for widows than it did widowers.49 In an
opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court distinguished

43. See Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 126; Franke, supra note 11,
at 70; cf. Andrew Gilden, Preserving Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal Courts and the
Berdache Tradition, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 237, 244 (2007); Yoshino, supra note
11, at 361-62.
44. 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 n.10 (1974) (holding that a Florida statute did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause and was valid, and noting that “gender has never been
rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances”).
45. 419 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1975) (holding that the statutory scheme according to
which women naval officers require a thirteen year tenure of commissioned service
before mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while requiring the mandatory
discharge of male officers who are twice passed over for promotion but who might
have less than thirteen years of commissioned services, did not violate the Due Process
Clause in light of the Court’s failure to address the underlying discriminatory practice
that prohibited the female sex to engage in combat and its application of a chauvinistic
protection of the female sex based on archaic presumptions).
46. 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (holding—through a very cursory assessment of the
law’s legal history and fallacious reasoning—that Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference
statute providing that all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be
considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveteran did not deprive women
of equal protection under the law, despite the statute’s actual application).
47. 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding that “gender-based” classifications must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives, and that statistical evidence as to incidence of drunken
driving among males and females between the ages of 18 and 21 was insufficient to
support the “gender-based” discrimination arising from the Oklahoma statute in
question).
48. See, e.g., Feeny, 442 U.S. at 267, 274; Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-03; Schlesinger,
419 U.S. at 506-07; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 354-53, 355 n.10.
49. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 352.
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the law from the one invalidated the preceding term by arguing that, unlike
Frontiero, Florida had enacted the statute to “rectify the effects of past
discrimination against women.”50 The Court’s reasoning, however, was
informed by archaic socio-cultural stereotypes of the female sex as less
qualified and dependent on males, paternalistically asserting that “[g]ender
has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all
instances.”51 Consequently, the Court, much to the chagrin of Justice
Brennan, defended the law on the very same sex-normative stereotypes and
stigmatization that it rejected in Frontiero.52
By the time the Court deemed unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute
setting the legal age of alcohol consumption of the male and female sexes
at twenty-one and eighteen, respectively, the practice of conflating the
terms sex and gender was deeply entrenched within the Court’s analysis.53
The Oklahoma statute was premised on statistical evidence that allegedly
supported findings that males under the age of twenty-one were more likely
to drive recklessly under the influence of alcohol54 than their female
counterparts.55 While the statistical findings of the Oklahoma legislature
appeared to be premised solely on the basis of sex, the Court proceeded
under an analysis that included references to gender expressive conduct
closely associated with society’s sex-normative stereotypes:
The very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws,
are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative
statistics. Hence “reckless” young men who drink and drive are
transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are
chivalrously escorted home.56

Nonetheless, the greatest failure of the Court’s reasoning was its
50. Id. at 356 n.8.
51. Id. at n.10.
52. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that classifications based on
either sex or gender, like classifications based on race, must be subject to strict
scrutiny); see also id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting) (finding that “gender-based”
classifications are inherently suspect); accord Feeny, 442 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the plurality’s cursory assessment of a law that it deemed
“gender-neutral” perpetuates what the Court had previously invalidated by limiting
females to occupations previously regarded as falling into society’s sex-normative
stereotypical roles); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 511 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority’s troublesome failure to address the larger issue of the Navy’s
discriminatory practice in prohibiting females’ assignment to roles considered improper
for the female sex).
53. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 190.
54. Admittedly deemed “nonintoxicating” 3.2% beer by the plurality. Id. at 19192.
55. Id. at 200-01.
56. Id. at 202 n.14.
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recognition of what it had come to understand as the “relevant differences”
between the male and female sexes.57 The recognition of these so-called
relevant differences permitted the Court to build its “gender
discrimination” jurisprudence on “the presumption, that on a fundamental
level, males and females are not similarly situated.”58 Consequently, the
reasoning of the Court in Craig v. Boren solidified two striking
malfeasances. First, by erroneously accepting that certain biological
characteristics enable the law to regard the male and female sexes as totally
different beings, the Court eradicated the possibility of ever achieving true
equality amongst those who vary the established binary with regard to sex
and gender.59 This first malfeasance allowed the Court to essentially
endorse “gender discriminatory” conduct by disaggregating the terms “sex”
and “gender” to the benefit of certain moral whims.60 In essence, it
permitted biology to serve as “[an] excuse of cover for social practices that
hierarchize individual members of” the male sex over members of the
female sex or to serve as an excusable pretext for judicial application of
Christian morals, affirming certain sex-normative stereotypes of the binary
construct of male and female.61 Second, the Court’s reasoning bolstered a
“gender discriminatory” worldview in which members of the transgender
community are a subhuman species because they fall neither physically nor
psychologically into what the Court has recognized as the constructions of
the male and female sexes.62

57. Id. at 199 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972)).
58. Franke, supra note 11, at 11; see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 146 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“But to say that gender makes no
difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter
of fact.”); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975).
59. Franke, supra note 11, at 11.
60. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (holding that a federal statute
making it more difficult for a child born abroad out of wedlock to one United States
parent to claim citizenship if that parent was the father did not violate the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because
of the Court’s “acknowledg[ment] of basic biological differences” between the sexes);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy was constitutional); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no equal protection violation where a transsexual
airline employee was terminated as a pilot); Sommers v. Budget Mktg, Inc., 667 F.2d
748, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661
(9th Cir. 1977); cf. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 362, 373.
61. Franke, supra note 11, at 3; see Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (“Proscriptions
against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots.”).
62. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087; Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 39;
Yoshino, supra note 11, at 371.
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IV. THE FLAWED APPLICATION OF UNDERSTANDING OF IDENTITY
Much like the legal inequities suffered by individuals whose genders
manifest directly in conflict with their sexes, members of the gay, lesbian,
and bisexual communities have also struggled to attain constitutional
protections against discrimination premised on their sexual orientation.63
This struggle finds its origin within the first malfeasance indoctrinated into
the “gender discrimination” analysis.64
Bowers v. Hardwick provides a glaring example of the Court’s erroneous
understanding of identity within the context of its “gender discrimination”
jurisprudence.65 There, in a five-to-four ruling, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral and anal sex
in private between consenting adults when applied to relations between
homosexuals. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron R. White failed to
recognize the interest respondent Hardwick66 had at stake and
contemptuously mischaracterized the issue in terms of what the majority
merely considered reprehensible conduct.67 As a consequence, Michael
Hardwick’s sexual orientation—a facet of his innate identity—was
distorted into nothing more than capriciously wicked conduct. By
engaging in this mischaracterization, however, the Court—yet again—
rendered its judgment on the basis of archaic socio-cultural, sex-normative
stereotypes of the roles of the male and female sex.68 To the Bowers Court,

63. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain consensual
intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that an amendment to
Colorado’s constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect persons identifying as either homosexual or bisexual from
discrimination was unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bowers,
478 U.S. at 188-90; Perry v. Brown, 671 F.2d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
California’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional under an equal protection
and due process analysis).
64. See supra Part II.
65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
66. Id. at 188. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court of Georgia’s judgment and held that “the
Georgia statute violated [Hardwick]’s fundamental rights because his homosexual
activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state
regulation” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See id. at 189 (citing Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)).
67. Id. at 188, 190, 192-93; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(likening homosexuality to “reprehensible” acts such as murder and cruelty to animals).
68. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
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rejecting discriminatory practices based on sexual orientation was
perceived as an endorsement of homosexual conduct and an advancement
in the Court’s understanding of the “gender discrimination” doctrine that
remained outside the comfort of the majority’s moral compass.69
It would take the Court another seventeen years to adopt an analytical
standard remotely similar to that which Justice Brennan originally alluded
in Frontiero.70 In reexamining the issue posed to the Bowers Court, on
behalf of the Court’s majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy explicitly
acknowledged the Court’s previous “failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake.”71 Further, in rejecting its previous reasoning regarding the
consensual acts between persons expressing the intimacy of a relationship,
the Court embraced a more “transcendent[ly] dimension[ional]”72
understanding of an individual’s constitutionally protected liberty, stating:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mysteries of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.73

69. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the “condemnation”
of homosexuality is “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards” and
characterizing it as “‘the infamous crime against nature’ as an offense of ‘deeper
malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be named’” (quoting, in part, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *215)); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 84851 (1992) (finding reliance in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt, supra note 5, at 186.
70. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, it is not correct today, and is hereby overruled.”). For other
efforts by the Court to broaden the scope of its “gender discrimination” jurisprudence,
see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 545 (1996) (holding that Virginia
failed to show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for excluding women from the
citizen-soldier program at the Virginia Military Institute, and, therefore, violated the
Equal Protection Clause); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that a
Mississippi statute that terminated a mother’s parental rights and precluded her ability
to file an appeal on the basis of an astronomical preparation fee was in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994)
(applying the reasoning of Batson to efforts of precluding members of the female sex
from sitting as panelists on a jury); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
719 (1982) (holding that a Mississippi statute that excludes males from enrolling in a
state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause).
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
72. Id. at 562.
73. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
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In essence, by affirming the Court’s reasoning initially imparted in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,74 the Court
promulgated within its interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments an “interweaving of autonomy and dignity”
interests75 that safeguards one’s individual right to determine and express
one’s core identity.76
The Court additionally recognized in Lawrence that the Texas statute did
more than criminalize what the Court had previously deemed “homosexual
sodomy.”77 In that regard, the Court rejected arguments trivializing the
disparate treatment suffered by individuals convicted for violating Texas’
criminal statute, noting that those convictions would permanently remain
on the individuals’ records and carry a collateral consequence of forever
being condemned as sexual offenders.78 Indeed, in the eyes of the majority,
the statute criminalized a portion of an individual’s core identity and
promoted discrimination against persons whose identities failed to comport
with what some members of the Bowers Court had considered “normal.”79
74. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis requires
reaffirming Roe v. Wade’s central conclusion recognizing a woman’s right to choose an
abortion before fetal viability notwithstanding its rejection of the trimester framework
and adoption of an undue burden test). The matter to which the Court referenced was
its prior recognition of the right of the individual to make “personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education” found within the penumbras of the Constitution. Id. at 847-51.
75. Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 124.
76. Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1217 (arguing that universities should permit
transgender students to choose a gender-specific dorm based on gender identity rather
than their biological sex).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (2003) (referencing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
190, 192 (1986)).
78. Id. at 575-76. One need not look far to see the social injustices faced by
members of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities. A conviction of criminalized
“homosexual conduct” had grave consequences, many of which were the result of
Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children coalition, which propounded conservative Christian
beliefs regarding the sinfulness of homosexuality and the perceived threat of
homosexual recruitment of children through child molestation. Further, efforts by
other public activists throughout the 1960s and 1970s would have banned members of
the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities and their supporters from working within
public schools. See CRAIG RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN
AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (Temple U. Press 2008); see also,
e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 (1966).
79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see
Lawrence, 349 U.S. at 567, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that criminalizing
conduct common in homosexual relationships would invite discrimination even if the
statute was held unenforceable on equal protection grounds); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that discrimination against
homosexuality is not as reprehensible as racial discrimination, and portraying those
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Thus, by appreciating an individual’s liberty interest in self-identification,
the Court repudiated the criminal statute for bolstering a social
stigmatization that infringed on the dignity of the individual’s identity. It
observed that the stigma wrongly created portrayals of John Lawrence,
Tyron Garner (his sexual companion), and others who identify as lesbian,
gay, and bisexual as part of a subhuman species.80
Although the Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual’s liberty
interest in one’s core identity provided tremendous leaps toward a greater
understanding of the right to self-autonomy, Lawrence equally functions as
a missed opportunity to bridge the remaining gap in the Court’s
development of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its previous decisions in Roe v.
Wade81 and Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but it
failed to acknowledge the nexus among the three.82 Roe, Casey, and
Lawrence all maintained one striking similarity to the Court’s decision in
Frontiero: the infringements on the individual’s right to self-identify and to
manifest his or her own destiny were premised on a rejection of sexnormative stereotypes about the roles of the male and female sexes.83
Therefore, the unconstitutional violation of substantive due process within
the cases all fundamentally comport with “gender discriminatory”
conduct.84
For example, much like the social stigmatization of gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals through the criminalization of same-sex physically intimate
conduct,85 the stigmatization that members of the female sex face through
the criminalization of abortion are equally adverse.86 In his concurring
opinion within Casey, Justice Harold A. Blackmun recognized the inherent

who would acknowledge the existence of an individual liberty interest in self-identity
for members of the lesbian, bisexual, and gay communities as villainous).
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also supra Part II (discussing the second
malfeasance created by the Court’s acceptance of the relevant differences doctrine).
81. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a Texas criminal abortion statute
prohibiting a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy at any stage except to save the life of
the mother was unconstitutional. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565, 573-74.
83. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1505; Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 375; Tribe,
supra note 1, at 1902-04.
84. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Casey, 505 U.S. at 929 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part).
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
86. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1505, 1541; Tribe, supra note 1, at 1902-04,
1926-27.
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gender-discriminatory suffering of females who reject the archaic sexnormative stereotypical role of motherhood:
A state’s restrictions on a women’s right to terminate her pregnancy also
implicates constitutional guarantees of gender equality . . . . By
restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women’s bodies into service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and, in most instances,
provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women
for these services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter
of course.87

Indeed, throughout Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Casey, and
throughout the majority opinion he authored in Roe v. Wade, Justice
Blackmun emphasized the social stigmatization of females who faced
unwed motherhood.88 While unwed motherhood would not commonly
result in the collateral consequence of being labeled a sex offender, it could
result in the collateral consequence of bearing society’s badge of shame,
comparable to the proverbial “scarlet letter.”89
Ultimately, the stigmatization suffered by Hardwick, Lawrence, and Roe
derives directly from the archaic socio-normative stereotypes that mandate
how the male and female sexes are “supposed” to behave by presuming
that males and females are fundamentally different.90 The violative
government conduct that infringed upon the right to self-indentify operates
under the following two theories: (1) males engaging in “immoral”
homosexual sodomy violate “biological” and “natural” law by participating
in non-procreative sex;91 and (2) females who sought to abort their
pregnancies violated “natural” law by rejecting the “biological” role of
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment, and dissenting in part); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases
challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over her [own] destiny.’ . . .
There was a time, not so long ago, when women were ‘regarded as the center of home
and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and
independent legal status under the Constitution.’”) (internal citations omitted).
88. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 923; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be
involved.”).
89. Indeed, much like Nathaniel Hawthorne’s character, Hester Prynne, many of
Roe’s unwed female contemporaries would bear and beget children that would serve as
the embodiment of a badge of sin and shame for all to see. See NATHANIEL
HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 3, The Modern Library (Ross C. Murin ed., Boston
1991); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“[A female’s] suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of history and our culture.”).
90. See Franke, supra note 11, at 11; cf. Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 38.
91. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
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preserving the continuation of the human species through the assumed roles
of spouse and mother.92
But while the Supreme Court has invalidated government action that
operates under the erroneous assumptions of the acceptable roles of the
male and female sexes, the Court has failed to recognize that these
unconstitutional violations of substantive due process constitute “gender
discriminatory” conduct.93 Because the Court has failed to fully realize that
safeguards to one’s individual right to determine and express one’s core
identity94 are synonymous with safeguards against gender discrimination,
lower courts continue to operate under a defective equal protection
analysis, erroneously assessing claims arising out of government action or
out of an action of private citizens that infringes on a claimant’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights.95 Consequently, the Court’s failure precludes the
achievement of true equality among the sexes and the gender variant.96
Accordingly, federal appellate courts will continue their debate as to what
“gender discrimination” is and whether jurisprudence evaluating the
subject extends to members of the transgender community.97
V. THE CONFLICT DEFINED: THE UNCERTAINTY OF PROTECTIONS
AFFORDED UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case relating to the constitutional
rights of transgender individuals outside the scope of the Eighth
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.98 As a
92. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(invalidating a state statute that required prior written consent of the spouse of a
pregnant female seeking an abortion unless the abortion was necessary to protect the
life of the mother); Roe, 410 U.S. at 142-43 (documenting the American Medical
Association Committee on Criminal Abortion’s views in the nineteenth century on
abortion when the life of the mother was not in danger).
93. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 386.
94. Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1217 (noting the Court’s failure to adequately
protect the transgender culture and positing that universities should allow students to
self-identify with a particular gender in accordance with due process).
95. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides, in
relevant part, that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
96. See Franke, supra note 11, at 11.
97. Compare Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011), Smith v.
City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2004), and Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2000), with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d
1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007), and Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085
(7th Cir. 1984).
98. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that “prison officials
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result, lower courts continue to debate the meaning of “gender
discrimination” and whether the doctrine’s jurisprudence extends to
members of the transgender community suffering prejudicial conduct
ultimately leading to the wrongful termination of their employment.99
Further, the Court’s conflation and disaggregation of the terms “sex” and
“gender” and its mistaken recognition of the “relevant differences” between
the male and female sexes have provided lower courts free range to deny
constitutional protections by using outdated biological concepts as a
scathing pretext.100
may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of
confinement only if they know that an inmate faces substantial risk of serious harm and
disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”). In fact, Dee
Farmer’s transgender status was ancillary to the Court’s interpretation of its previous
understanding of the Eight Amendment, and the only sentiment the majority imparted
regarding Farmer’s status was the belief that those who are transgender suffer “‘[a] rare
psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her
anatomical sex’ and who typically seeks medical treatment including hormonal therapy
and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.” Id. at 829 (citing AM. MED.
ASSOC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 74-75 (3d rev. ed.
1987) [hereinafter DSM-III].
99. See generally Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316; Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218; Smith, 378
F.3d at 567-68; Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 74849 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566, F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir.
1977), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
100. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218 (holding that the dismissal of a transgender
individual’s claims was permissible); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that a transgender inmate’s allegation that some prisoners were given
hormone therapy when others were not was not sufficient to state a claim for which
relief could be granted under a theory of equal protection); Creed v. Family Express
Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *5, *9-11 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009)
(denying Ms. Creed protections under Title VII and concluding that the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did not extend to sex-specific dress
codes); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45-46 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (concluding that the denial of a transgender claimant’s right to use the
women’s restroom did not amount to gender discriminatory conduct); Johnson v. Fresh
Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998-1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (concluding that the
discharge of a transgender employee after she refused to use the men’s room did not
amount to a violation of Title VII of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Oiler v.
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002) (disdainfully referring to plaintiff as a “cross-dresser” and denying Title VII
protections); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that the transgender community is not protected under Title VII in claims
instigated by employers who forbid transgender plaintiffs from using women’s
restrooms); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (holding that plaintiff was
not to be permitted to use the women’s restroom because she was not “biologically
female”).
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While not the first court to address whether Title VII extends
constitutional protections to a transgender individual, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.,101 has become the leading rationale in denying Title VII’s
extension of constitutional safeguards to transgender persons in order to
combat incidents of workplace discriminatory conduct brought on by
private citizens.102 In Judge Harlington Wood, Jr.’s deplorably brief sixpage opinion, he demonstrates a conspicuous perpetuation of the “gender
discrimination” jurisprudential deficiencies by disaggregating sex from
gender.103 Through his authorship, the court adopts a fallacious
presupposition that sex is biologically defined solely by the fundamental
presence of “chromosomes, internal and external genitalia, hormones, and
gonads” that are generally correlative to one sex in Euro-American
society’s binary construction of male and female.104 Thus, the court failed
to engage in any inquiry that may have engendered an understanding that
sex is purely a perceived identity related to, but not determinative of, one’s
innate gender.105
Rather, the court institutionally denigrated a person’s transgender status
as “[a] rare psychiatric disorder,”106 or as an existence comprised of paltry,
unaccepted “cultural attitudinal characteristic[s].”107
Even more
101. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
102. While the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment are self-executing against government action, Section 5 of the
Amendment as well as Clause 3 within Section 8 of Article I of the United States
Constitution provide the special role of Congress in promulgating constitutional
protections against private conduct. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 244-45 (1964) (upholding congressional regulation of private conduct under
the Article I, Section 8, Clause 3); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-04
(1964) (delineating, further, congressional power to regulate private conduct under the
combined functions of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment). See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (denying
regulation solely under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083-84.
104. Id. at 1083 n.5-6.
105. Id. at 1083 n.6, 1084.
106. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3
(relying on AM. MED. ASSOC., supra note 98, at 1006); see also DSM III, supra note
98, at 261-63.
107. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-86 (reviewing congressional intent of the 1964 Act
with respect to rights of transgender individuals); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 158 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Individuals who identified
as homosexual suffered a similar institutional stigmatization of a mental disease until
the sexual orientation was declassified as such during early 1986. See RONALD BAYER,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (2d ed.
1987). Indeed, some scholars have completely rejected applications of the “gender
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reprehensible, however, is the court’s overtly contemptuous portrayal of
Karen Ulane’s efforts to correct the world’s perception of her identity by
conforming her outward appearance to her core identity:
[I]t may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane to be
female. But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created
from what remains of a man, that does not decide the case. If Eastern
[Airlines] had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated
against her because she was female . . . then the argument might be made
that Title VII applied . . . but that is not this case. It is clear from
evidence that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not
because she is female.”108

discrimination” doctrine to members of the transgender community. See, e.g., Hispanic
AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Elkind,
supra note 7, at 904. Instead, these scholars suggest that “considering transgenderism
as a disorder may more easily facilitate protections,” either under an application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act or a broader equal protection analysis. See, e.g.,
Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 47; Elkind, supra note 7, at 903.
Nevertheless, these propositions are misconceived. First, within the scope of a broader
equal protection claim, the Supreme Court has noted that discrimination resulting from
mental disability or illness is not subjected to a heightened standard of scrutiny. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (requiring the
government to propound merely a rational basis for the discriminatory conduct).
Second, framing transgender identity as a mental disability acquiesces to arguments
that the transgender identity is a serious medical and psychological problem that
constitutes a serious medical need. See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th
Cir. 1995); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v.
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). Additionally, it continues to perpetuate a
negative stigma on the transgender identity that only furthers animus. Cf. Pomerantz,
supra note 6, at 1225 (“This medicalization has permeated American jurisprudence,
which reflects the tending to pathologise transgenderism and ignore the complexities of
transgender identity.”).
Continued reliance of the medicalization of the transgender identity only reaffirms a
misunderstanding between the transgender identity and contrasting genitalia. This
misunderstanding and reliance on the false binary construct of the male and female
sexes additionally reifies notions that if a transgender individual is provided any
constitutional protection, it will be only after he or she undergoes gender corrective
surgery. Phyllis Frye notes many problems with relying on the surgical standard: “The
most common reason for delaying surgery is the cost, which can run from $3,000 to
$40,000 depending on whether the person is [a male-to-female] or [female-to-male]
and the type of corrections desired.” Frye, supra note 24, at 160 n.118. The presence
of “genitalia is not the sole indicator of sex.” Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll.
Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004),
aff’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, demanding details about the
transgender individual’s genitalia implicates an individual’s right to privacy in personal
information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (describing two kinds of
privacy interests: informational privacy and decisional privacy). Mostly importantly, it
completely distorts the cognizable issue: “gender discrimination.”
108. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (relying on Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
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Embracing the Supreme Court’s second malfeasance,109 the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion portrays Ulane as nothing more than a subhuman species
precluded from any constitutionally based protections under Title VII
because—in the eyes of the court—she was neither male nor female, but,
rather the scientific creation of accomplished doctors.110 In sum, Judge
Wood’s malign discussion of Ulane’s plight effectively removed Ulane’s
humanity and thus eviscerated the humanity of the transgender identity.111
While much of Ulane’s reasoning has been presumably overruled,112
many courts encountering similarly situated claimants continue to espouse
a bereft assessment of the terms sex and gender and derisively use the
medicalization of the transgender identity to deny any and all legal
recourse.113 As recently as 2009, the United States District Court for the
District of Indiana declined to grant Title VII protections to a transgender
claimant wrongfully terminated from her employment because she refused
to conform to a male sex-specific physical presentation while working.114
Without question, the workplace has maintained its status, since the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ulane, as a battleground on which the fight
for transgender equality continues to be overwhelmingly disastrous.115
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s explicit extension of Title VII
claims to discriminatory conduct premised on archaic, sex-normative

F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
2000)).
109. See supra Part II.
110. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (relying on Sommers v. Budget Mtkg., Inc., 667 F.2d
748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), and Holloway, 566 F.2d 659, overruled by Schwenk,
204 F.3d 1187); see also Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 39.
111. See generally Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining
Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 329, 345 (1999).
112. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (declining to
follow Ulane and arguing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 190 (1989) (redefining the protections afforded under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964), eviscerates discriminatory practices against transgender
individuals by concluding the archaic conduct of sex-stereotyping unconstitutional).
113. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v.
Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06CV-465, 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); Johnson v. Fresh Mark., Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 003114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717
(Minn. 2001); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 52 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005).
114. See Creed, No. 3:06-CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *1, *10 (N.D. Ind. 2009).
115. See, e.g., Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000; Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 287; Goins,
635 N.W.2d at 725; Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
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stereotypes,116 lower courts have continued to use the disaggregation of sex
and gender in addition to the false binary construct to deny transgender
employees any legal remedy.117 Most notably, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority118
provides yet another case that chronicles the very conduct the Supreme
Court invalidated in Frontiero119 and Price Waterhouse,120 particularly
within the context of discriminatory conduct against transgender persons in
the workplace.
Krystal Etsitty presented the appellate court with two Title VII claims of
wrongful termination.121 First, she averred that she was wrongfully
terminated on the basis of her transgender status.122 Second, she contended
that she was wrongfully terminated for refusing to conform to Utah Transit
Authority’s “expectations of stereotypically male behavior,” in that she
used women’s bathrooms along her assigned bus routes.123 The court
rejected Etsitty’s first claim by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Ulane that unlawful sex discrimination must only be viewed as the
“unlawful . . . discriminat[ion] against women because they are women and
men because they are men,”124 thereby disaggregating sex from gender
once more. Much like the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit failed to
extend any constitutionally based protections under Title VII to Etsitty
because she did not comport with the illusory binary construct of male and
female recognized in the Supreme Court’s long-standing “gender
discrimination” jurisprudence.125
In addition, the appellate court declined to abide by the Supreme Court’s
explicit extension of Title VII claims to discriminatory conduct premised

116. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII’s
prohibit of sex discrimination included discriminatory conduct based on an individual’s
rejection of the sex-normative stereotypes that have traditionally defined the acceptable
behavior and roles of the male and female sexes. 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989).
117. See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1220; Brown, 63 F.3d at 971; Creed, No. 3:06CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *6; Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d 996; Oiler, No. Civ.A. 003114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6; Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 284; Goins, 635 N.W.2d at
725; Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
118. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1215.
119. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
121. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1220-21.
122. Id. at 1218-19.
123. Id. at 1218, 1224.
124. Id. at 1221 (relying on Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085
(7th Cir. 1984)).
125. See supra Part II.
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Although the court
on archaic, sex-normative stereotypes.126
acknowledged that “use of a restroom is an inherent part of one’s
identity,”127 it dismissed any argument that Etsitty’s transgender status
inherently did not conform with sex-normative stereotypes.128 Instead, the
court extended the false binary construct of biological sex by concluding:
Etsitty may not claim protection under Title VII based upon her
transsexuality per se. Rather, Etsitty’s claim must rest entirely on the
Price Waterhouse theory of protection as a man who fails to conform to
sex stereotypes. However far Price Waterhouse reaches, this court
cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological males to use
women’s restrooms. Use of a restroom designated for the opposite sex
does not constitute a mere failure to conform to sex stereotypes.129

The Tenth Circuit’s judgment is erroneous. Even though the court
suggested that bathroom access—whether in or outside the workplace—for
the transgender individual is fundamentally related to an individual right to
liberty, it nevertheless unreasonably concluded that discrimination against a
transgender individual—because his or her innate gender is incongruent
with a perceived sex or the normative, stereotypical roles of that sex—is
outside the ambit of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence.130
In contrast, other federal appellate and lower courts have determined that
“all persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination
on the basis of” sex-normative stereotypes.131 Although these courts
adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning within Price Waterhouse132 to
extend protections to transgender persons, the vast majority of these courts
did so through a misunderstanding of the transgender individual’s
126. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224-25 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 250-52 (1989)).
127. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1226.
128. Id. at 1224-25.
129. Id. (incorrectly relying on Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7
(9th Cir. 2001)).
130. Id. at 1224-26, 1228.
131. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v.
City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d
213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008); Lopez v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell
v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. Civ.A 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21,
2006); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004
WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d, 325 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. 2009);
Tronetti v. Healthnet Lakshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2003). But see Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011).
132. 490 U.S. at 256 (1989).
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interests.133 Because these courts continue failing to fully appreciate the
liberty interests at stake, they produce an ideology that similarly regards the
transgender identity as inherently inferior.134
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio,135 demonstrates this predicament. Despite the court’s
extension of Title VII’s constitutionally-based protections to Smith through
an adoption of the Price Waterhouse analysis, the court failed to recognize
Smith’s transgender identity by improperly referring to Smith with
masculine pronouns throughout its opinion.136 Admittedly, this failure to
recognize Smith’s transgender identity in large part arises out of the
manner in which Smith pled the case before the federal district and
appellate courts.137 Admittedly, this begs the question whether Smith chose
to portray herself as a male because she believed that an adoption of the
Price Waterhouse analysis would have otherwise been foreclosed.
An evaluation of other lower court opinions overwhelmingly suggests
that, had Smith presented the claim on the basis of nonconformity with the
assumed sex that is in comport with her innate gender, the presiding court
would have likely declined an extension of Title VII protections under the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Price Waterhouse.138
Therefore, an
application of Price Waterhouse suggests that a transgender claimant must
assume the sex in conflict with his or her gender in order to be provided
any constitutionally based protections. It appears that the transgender
claimant is required to embrace the second malfeasance within “gender
discrimination” jurisprudence by falsely accepting the incorrect
presumption that manifestations of his or her innate identity are merely a
rejection of the employer’s binary construct of sex and gender.139
133. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 729; Smith, 378 F.3d at 566; Rosa, 214 F.3d at
213; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1187.
134. See generally Alfieri, supra note 5, at 828.
135. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
136. Id. at 566.
137. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to the Court’s Show of Cause Order at 1, Smith v.
City of Salem, Ohio, No. 4:02CV1405, 2003 WL 25720984 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2003),
rev’d, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
138. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737-38; Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215-26; Lopez v. River
Oaks, 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm,
Inc., No. Civ.A 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006); Tronetti v.
TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2003).
139. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“What matters
for purposes of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that [in] the mind of the
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the
perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed the victim was a man who
‘failed to act like’ one.”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

25

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 4

890

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

Accordingly, even sympathetic lower courts extending protections to
transgender individuals partake in an erroneous analysis of the true
interests at stake. “Gender discrimination” is substantially more complex
than conduct resulting in the disparate treatment of an individual premised
on one’s sex. “Gender discrimination” offends the very core of an
individual’s inborn identity. But without explicit recognition from the
Supreme Court that “gender discrimination” is premised on more than
conduct resulting in the disparate treatment of one’s sex, the possibility of
consistent extensions of constitutional protections to transgender persons
remains nebulous. Is it possible, however, that another branch of the
United States government may provide the requisite understanding to
safeguard the transgender person’s rights?
VI. REDEFINING “GENDER DISCRIMINATION” AND BROADENING THE
SCOPE OF PROTECTION
On April 20, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC) released an administrative adjudicatory opinion explicitly
providing Title VII’s protections to members of the transgender
community.140 Many advocates have begun to argue that the EEOC has
handed transgender claimants a breakthrough victory that provides reliable
legal protection.141 To be sure, an administrative agency such as the EEOC
is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative
proceeding,142 and courts generally defer to an agency’s conclusion when
Congress has not directly addressed the precise issue.143 But transgender
advocates should view the agency’s decision with at least some trepidation.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the EEOC’s guidance in
interpreting Title VII, the Court has nonetheless determined that the
EEOC’s guidelines are not binding authority.144 In addition, the EEOC’s
2008).
140. Macy, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *16 (April 20,
2012).
141. See Morgan Lewis, EEOC Broadens and Clarifies Scope of Title VII
Enforcement,
JD
SUPRA
LAW
NEWS
(Apr.
30,
2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/eeoc-broadens-and-clarifies-scope-of-tit-74169;
Chris Geidner, Transgender Breakthrough: EEOC Ruling That Gender-Identity
Discrimination Is Covered by Title VII Is a “Sea Change” That Opens the Doors to
Employment Protection for Transgender Amerians, METRO WEEKLY (Apr. 23, 2012,
10:38 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=7288 (citing Masen Davis of the
Transgender Law Center and Shannon Minter of the National Center for Lesbian
Rights).
142. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974).
143. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
144. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), superseded on
other grounds by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 §1, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
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decision, although favorable to the transgender claimant, inadvertently
supports the continued adoption of the Court’s second malfeasance within
“gender discrimination” jurisprudence by assuming that manifestations of
the transgender claimant’s identity are merely a rejection of the judiciary’s
conflated understanding of sex and gender.145
As a result, lower courts unpersuaded by arguments requesting the
adoption of the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse analysis to issues
involving the transgender community will likely remain unyielding because
of the judiciary’s continued failure to understand the complex
interrelationship of sex and gender. Thus, transgender claimants will
continue struggling to garner the judiciary’s exercise of heightened scrutiny
to invalidate the inequitable transgressions of government and private
action until the Court rectifies its imprecise development of “gender
discrimination” jurisprudence.146
“Gender discrimination” is neither premised on the presence of
rudimentary biological indicators nor is it the mere infringement upon the
physicality of one’s person.147 “Gender discrimination” attacks the very
core of an individual’s innate identity as well as the individual’s ability to
manifest his or her own destiny. Certainly, “gender discriminatory”
conduct falls within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause. But “gender
discrimination” is, first and foremost, a violation of an individual’s
substantive due process right to liberty.148 As Justice Kennedy observed in
Lawrence:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests.149

Justice Kennedy’s reasoning reflects the Court’s promising move

Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142).
145. See supra Part II.
146. See supra Part III. Professor Yoshino additionally suggests that litigants’
attempts to acquire a heightened scrutiny analysis “have an increasingly antiquated air
in federal constitutional litigation, as the last classification accorded heightened
scrutiny by the Supreme Court was that based on non-marital parentage in 1977.”
Yoshino, supra note 12, at 756-57.
147. See supra Part II.
148. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 512 n.1
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality
opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
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towards an acknowledgement that the equality and the liberty interests are
“intertwined.”150 Therefore, while the Court’s opinion in Lawrence does,
in part, function as a missed opportunity in protecting an individual’s
inborn identity against “gender discrimination,” Lawrence also signals an
explicit appreciation for claims asserted on the dual premises of equality
and liberty by “str[iking] the chains of history from due process
jurisprudence.”151
Further, the Court’s recognition of substantive due process “libertybased dignity claim[s]”152 implicitly suggests a death knell to the antiquated
equal protection methodology based upon highlighting the differences
between claimants.153 To be sure, “[t]he Court left no doubt that it was
protecting the equal liberty and dignity not of atomistic individuals torn
from their social context, but of people as they relate to, and interact with,
one another,”154 by emphasizing what we as humans all have in common.155
One commonality that remains at the very “heart of liberty” is “the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.”156 Surely, government or private action
resulting in “gender discrimination” constitutes infringement on the
individual’s right to self-identify and to manifest his or her own destiny,
premised on a rejection of sex-normative stereotypes about the roles of the
male and female sexes.157
Notwithstanding this glaringly obvious link between equality and liberty,
lower courts will continue to operate under the judiciary’s misconceived
understandings of sex, gender, and “gender discrimination.”158
150. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 748-49; see also Brown, supra note 12, at 1505,
1507, 1541; Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 375; Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence
of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 211 (2011); Tribe, supra note 1, at 1934.
151. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 777; see also Tribe, supra note 1, at 1899.
152. See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 779; see also Henry, supra note 150, at 189;
Tribe, supra note 1, at 1898.
153. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 794. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1960).
154. Tribe, supra note 1, at 1898.
155. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 796.
156. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
157. Cf. Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 126.
158. Cf. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown
v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No.
3:06-CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); Johnson v. Fresh Mark,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No.
Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Dobre v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Goins v. W. Grp., 635
N.W.2d 717, 725 (Minn. 2001); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court must redress its “gender discrimination”
jurisprudence through an explicit recognition of liberty within its “gender
discrimination” analyses.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article seeks to challenge archaic assumptions about sex and gender
as well as the Supreme Court’s conflation and disaggregation of the two
terms. Judicial reliance on these outmoded assumptions has resulted in the
complete impediment of achieving total gender equality by recognizing
what the Court has deemed the “relevant differences” between the sexes.
To members of the transgender community, this conflict is inescapable, and
the law has generated grave uncertainty with little to no protective recourse
for these conflicts as they arise within the workplace. But until the Court
rejects “conformance to a background social norm—i.e., that there must
always be complete unity between sexual anatomy and gender identity—
those individuals”159 who maintain the transgender identity will continue to
suffer disastrous consequences in the workplace.

N.Y.S.2d 43, 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
159. See Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 138.
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